The general equilibrium model with incomplete markets is here extended to infinite horizon economies populated. by a finite number of infinitely-lived agents. The crucial issue which divides the infinite horizon setting from the finite horizon setting is in the nature of borrowing constaints which added to spot constraints define a plausible budget set for individual agents. The paper relates seyen altemative definitions of equilibrium and states corresponding equilibrium existence theorems when assets are one-period and purely financial.
Introduction
This paper deals with the equilibrium existence in infinite horizon economies with a finite number oí agents and incomplete markets. It is in the line oí a recent literature beginning with Levine (1989) and going mainly through the successive versions oípapers by Hernandez and Santos (1991) , Magill and Quinzii [(1994) , first circulated in 1992], Levine and Zame (1992) , Woodíord [(1993), previous version in 1992] , Hernandez and Santos (1994) .
As is now very well known, in an incomplete market model that extends over an infinite time horizon, the first problem to solve is to define the individual budget sets so as to rule out Ponzi schemes while preserving incompleteness oí markets. Several suggestions have been made that provide not less than seven alternative definitions oí equilibrium. The different definitions share the property oí generalizing the usual one íor finite horizon economies with incomplete markets. The crucial difference between them is in the condition which, added to the spot budget constraints, prevents the agents írom rolling over indefinitely their debts.
A first type oí conditions limits explicitely or implicitely the possible amount oí debt hold in each date-event at the beginning oí the period (debt constraints) or at the end oí the period (borrowing limits). Such explicit restrictions may be personalized. Then, as asset prices, commodity prices, consumption plans and portíolio plans, the systems oí debt constraints or borrowing limits are components oí the equilibrium. But the explicit restrictions may also be endogenous, in the spirit oí what results írom an institutional debt regulation. This is the case íor the finitely effective debt constraints that prescribe in each node an almost finite-time debt-repayment.
A second type oí conditions is more controversial. In a kind oí solvency requirement, adapted írom Hernandez and Santos (1991) , the agents can be restricted not to hold debt in excess oí the present value oí their íuture savings or alternatively the agents cannot hold debt in the limito Present values are computed with respect to node prices that are not uniquely determined in the case oí incomplete markets and can differ among agents. This leads to a notion oí equilibrium with present value node prices where the node prices are components oí the equilibrium. An alternative condition, due to Magill and Quinzii (1994) , requires an asymptotic evolution oí the present value oí net indebtedness oí the agents in each subtree oí the event-tree defining the stochastic structure oí the model. This condition, in the spirit oí the subgame perfection, leads to the MQ-equilibrium defined in this paper ; it also uses personalized node prices.
As we will see later, if the individual present value price is summable, each budget set with node prices coincides with one budget set with debt constraints. However, in general, the budget sets involved in different equilibrium definitions do not coincide. We will state in this paper several inclusions, some of them are strict. Hemandez and Santos (1994) establish that a budget set with debt constraints which is of interest, the finitely effective budget set, is the intersection of all budget sets relative to some admissible system of node prices and also the intersection of all associated Arrow-Debreu budget sets. In view of inclusions which will be proved in this paper, the finitely effective budget set coincides also with the intersection of aH M-Q budget sets and with the intersection of all budget sets with loose and consistent debt constraints. But, generally, it strict1y contains the budget sets associated with bounded debt constraints or with implicit borrowing limits.
Our first result is an equilibrium existence result for what appears to be a weak equilibrium concept : an equilibrium with household specific loose and consistent debt constraints. ActuaHy, as Hernandez and Santos (1991) , we restrict ourselves to the case of nominal assets that expire after one periodo In this context, we generalize a result that is well known for finite horizon economies with purely nominal assets and prove that . any asset price process that prevents arbitrage can be embedded in an equilibrium of the infinite horizon economy. Obviously, the existence of equilibrium for the case of oneperiod numeraire assets foHows. ClassicaHy, in the proof of this result, we construct our ;'equilibrium as the limit for convenient topologies of each component of some particular . ' equilibrium of the truncated economies which are finite horizon economies with incomplete markets.
Then, comparing the different approaches, our main result is the equivalence, under appropriate assumptions, of six apparently quite distinct notions of equilibrium which give in fact the same equilibrium allocations and prices. Added to the first theorem, the equivalence theorem establishes equilibrium existence results comparable with the ones of Magill and Quinzii (1994) , Levine and Zame (1992) , Hernandez and Santos (1994) for the case of one-period numeraire assets. Its main interest seems to lie in the fact that it justifies the controversial node price approach. Indeed, at equilibrium, as proved by Hemandez and Santos (1994) , the agents are constrained by aH aclmissible systems ofnode prices but each agent uses a particular system of node prices to solve its optimization problem. With incomplete markets, without more assumptions, the particular systems of node prices rnay not coincide. Under special assumptions, Hernandez and Santos (1991) stated that the agents may agree about the choice of any same system of node prices.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present more precisely 2 .,
. At every node in the event-tree S described aboye, a finite number L of commodities are available and 'consumers trade commodities on spot markets. As in Bewley (1972) , we take the commodity space to be R oc ( S xL). Each consumer is classically described by a consumption set Xi e Roc(S xL), a preference relation ~i on Xi and a state-dependent initial endowment w i E Xi. On the other hand, at every node s, agents participate in a financial market. We assume that the set J s of financial instruments available at s is finite and that the only available financial assets are purely financial, one-period securities. Let r i (u) be the return in units of account that asset j E J s promises to pay at u E s+ and
----------------------------------------------
describes the financial structure at s and R = II R s denotes the financial structure of the sES economy. Finally, the economy is summarized by the list of data e= (S,R,(Xi,~i,wi)~l)' V\Te will make on e the fol1owing assumptions:
For each agent i, el -Xi = Rt, (S xL Before introducing the next assumption, we will give some notations. We will denote by F, the set {xi E tt,(S x L)I Ilxill oo ~ 2112::'1 will oo }. We emphasize that this set contains aH feasible allocations. If D e S, we will also use the notation XD for the characteristic function of Di so if a i is a process on S, the element aiXD is defined by ",This notation will be used for both the consumption and the portfolio plans. We will also assume that the financial markets verify: On the consumption side, our assumptions are standard. As Bewley (1972) , Magill and Quinzii (1994) , Levine and Zame (1992) , we restrict the consumers to positive bounded consumptions plans. Assumption C2 implies the assumption of commensurability made by Levine and Zame (1992) . Together with C4, Assumption C3 implies that for each xi E Xi and for each y E ft,(S x L) satisfying y(s,f) f. O for some node s and every commodity 4 f.., one has xi + y ~i xi. This assumption of monotonicity is weaker than the strong monotonicity: for each xi E Xi and for each y E lt,(S x L) \ {O}, one has xi + y ~i xi.
Continuity in the Mackey topology T(loo(S X L),l¡(S xL))
is the natural extension of the similar assumption made by Bewley (1972) to the case of an economy with time and uncertainty; it expresses the idea of the impatience of the agents. For a discussion of this assumption, see Bewley (1972) , Brown and Lewis (1981) , Mas-Colell and Zame (1991) .
The assumption C5 is a condition of unifonn impatience of the agents with respect to future consumption at each node. Similar assumptions can be found in Santos and Woodford (1993) , Levine and Zame (1992) , Hernandez and Santos (1994) . C5 is satisfied if the preferences of agent i are represented by an additively separable utility function :
where p defines a probability on each ST As to the financial strueture of the economy, the existence of an asset with positive returns is a classical assumption in an infinite horizon setting; it implies that the economy is ~'financially" connected enough. The second part of the assumption F emphasizes that there is no restriction on short-selling.
Equilibrium with debt constraints
At every s, the consumers face a commodity price p(s) E JRL (in view of the above assumptions, we can assume that p(s) E JR~) However in an infinite horizon, taking a market system of commodity and asset price processes (p,q) as given, we cannot define the budget set of agent i as the set Bi(p,q) = As in the example given by Hernandez and Santos (1991) , even if q is arbitrage-free, the· existence of Ponzi schemes prec1udes the existence of any optimal point in this kind of . seto So the literature has developed several additional constraints in order to prevent the consumers from rolling over their debts indefinitely.
One of them is the notion of debt constraint introduced by Levine and Zame (1992) that limits in each node the amount of debts held by the agents at the beginning of the periodo Fonnally, a system 01 debt constraints for the agent i is a function Di :
The portfolio zi(s) E IR}' satisfies the debt constraint Di at (J E s+, if r((J), zi(s) 2:: Di((J).
If we assume for convenience that zi(O-) def 0, the debt constraint in node °will always be satisfied and the budget set Bi (p, q, Di) is now defined as follows :
From this definition, it is evident that -Di(s) denotes the maximum amount of debt that i is allowed to hold at each s.
Equivalently, it is possible to define as Santos and Woodford (1993) If we associate with a system of borrowing limits Mi the system of debt constraints : (p,q,Di) , which means that the borrowing limits are tighter than the associate debt constraints. The previous inclusion becomes an e<tuality when the associate debt constraints satisfy looseness, one of the two properties w(~ now define.
Indeed, as Levine and Zame (1992) , we will focus our attention on debt constraints that satisfy two conditions. The first one is a consistency condition : if the debt today is bearable, there exists a portfolio plan zi (s) that leads to a bearable debt in each state of tomorrow. At this stage, we have to notice that this notion depends on the commodity and asset price process (p, q).
The system of debt constraints Di is said to be (p,q)-consistent if it is (p,q)-consistent at each node.
The economic interpretation of the definition is explained by the fol1owing remark. 
, . { and for all (J E s+, r((J) 
. ZI(S) ~ D'((J).
In other words, if the agent i arrives at node s with a debt r( s) . Zi(s -) satisfying the debt constraint in node s, there exists a consumption/income transfer plan at node s, (xi(s),zi(s)), such that zi(s) finances xi(s) and zi(s) satisfies the debt constraint in every node(JEs+.
A very simple example of a (p, q)-consistent system of debt constraints can be found in the fol1owing proposition. (O,r(s).zi(s-) (s-) . In this case, we define zi(s) = zi (s) and it follows from the spot constraint at node s, that
The second requirement is a looseness condition. If the debt today, financed by a portfolio plan zi (s) leads to a bearable debt in each state of tomorrow, then the debt today is bearable.
Definition 2. The system 01 debt constraints Di is (p, q)-l~ose at node s illor every
s). zi(s)::; O : The system 01 debt constraints Di is (p, q)-loose il it is (p, q)-loose at every node.

In particular, if Di is (p, q)-loose at node s then Di(s) ::; -p(s)· wi(s).
The economic interpretation of Definition 2 is explained by the following remark.
Remark 2. For a node s =1 O, an equivalent lormulation 01 the previous definition is that lor every plan (zi(s-),xi(s),zi(s))
.
" ::} D'(S)::; r(s)· ZI(S-). and lor all u E s+, r(u)· ZI(S) ~ D'(U).
In other words, if the agent i arrives at node s, with a debt res) . zi(s-) and uses a consumption/income transfer plan (x i (s), zi( s)) such that zi( s) finances x i (s) and zi(s) satisfies the debt constraint in every node u E s+, then the debt r(s). zi(s-) satisfies the debt constraint at node s.
A similar requirement can be found in Santos and Woodford (1993) who define as (p, q)-inessential a system of borrowing limits such that the associate system of debt constraints is (p, q)-loose. As an analogue of Remark 2, we have : a system of borrowing limits is (p, q)-inessential at s if and only if the borrowing constraint at s is satisfied whenever the borrowing constraint and the spot budget constraint can be jointly satisfied at every It is worthwhile to remark that ií a debt constraint is identically equal to zero, the system is consistent but in general not loose. In view oí a better understanding oí the properties oí debt constraints, we recall that the definition oí the budget set Bi(p, q, Di) involves both budget constraints and debt constraints. The íol1owing proposition will be proved in the appendix.
Proposition 2. Let Di be a 3Y3tem 01 debt constraints. 11 q is arbitrage-free,
(
ii) Moreover, il Di is (p,q)-loose, then there exists iJi (p, q).loose and consistent StLch
that Bi(p, q, iJi) = Bi (p, q, Di) and Di ~ iJi.
The first part oí this proposition was stated by Levine and Zame (1992) . The interpretation is that the consistency is to be required since a (p, q)-consistent system oí debt constraints appears to be a good representative element in the set oí debt constraints that give the same budget seto Looseness (or inessentialness íor borrowing limits) seems to be the most stringent requirement lightened by the next two remarks.
Remark 3. Let Mi be a system 01 borrowing limits. 11 the system 01 debt constraints
Di, associated with Mi, is (p,q)-loose, then Bi(p,q,D i ) e Bi(p,q,M i ) e Bi(p,q,D i ). JI moreover Di is (p,q)-consistent, then, lor every s, Mi(s) = min{q(s)· zi(s)\r(u). zi(s)
Beíore Remark 4, let us first introduce a definition borrowed írom Levine and Zame (1992) .
Definition 3. Given p and q, the amotLnt d < O can be repaid by conStLmer i in finite time
Irom node s il there exist zi and T stLch that
Let D}(5, p, q) D}(p, q) is also (p, q)-consistent. Hence when it is defined, the finitely effective system of debt constraints appears as the maximum of all possible systems of (p, q)-loose and consistent debt constraints.
Analogously, Santos and Woodford (1993) 
".s, M}(s,p,q) = min{q(s). zi(s)lr(O'). zi(s)
Final1y, assuming that no production or intertemporal storage is possible and that assets are in zero net supply, it remains to associate equilibrium definitions with the previous definitions of budget sets.
In the first one, adapted from Levine and Zame, the different systems of debt constraints are a component of the equilibrium.
Definitioll 4. An equilibrium with debt constraints of the economy
& = ((Xi, ~i,wi)~l' 5, R) is an element (("xi, zi, Di)~l' (p, q)) satisfying : (i) For all i, (xi,
zi) is optimal for each agent i in the budget set Ei(p, q, Di); (ii) For each i, Di is a (p, q)-loose and consistent system of debt constraints;
In the second one, adapted from Santos and Woodford who state the definition but do not consider the equilibrium existence problem, household specific borrowing limits are also a component oí the equilibrium. Ií we add the íol1owing requirement :
(ii) For eo.ch i, Mi is o.n inessentio.l system of borrowing limits in view oí Proposition 2 and Remark 3, the equilibrium concepts defined in 4 and 5 become equivalent.
In the third one, given the equilibrium price, the systems oí debt constraints are endogenously defined. (p, q) ) is an equilibrium with debt c.onstraints of the economy f .
Definition 6. A finitely effective equilibrium of the economy
. . Definition 6 is borrowed írom Levine and Zame. Given the previous observations and Theorem 3.3 in Hernandez and Santos (1994) , it is easy to understand that it coincides with the equilibrium definition adopted by Hernandez and Santos (1994) .
The two íol1owing definitions, adapted írom Levine and Zame, Magill and Quinzii respectively, replace an explicit definition oí the systems oí debt constraints (resp. borrowing limits) at equilibrium by the overal1 constraint that íor each consumer the real value oí the debt is uniíorrnly bounded írom below. More precisely, given p and q, let us define : 
Equilibriurn with present value node prices
In the definition oí the individual budget sets, a second approach adapted írom Hernandez and Santos (1991) and Magill and Quinzii (1994) is to add to spot budget constraints a transversality condition on the debt contracted at each periodo First let us recall a classical consequence oí the no-arbitrage condition. For every s, ií q(s) is arbitrage-íree, there exists a vector As E .1R~~,
Here, we will use a more precise statement.
Lernrna 3. {Schmachtenberg (1989)} and also {Hernandez and Santos (1991) The definition oí the individual budget sets is now based on (individualized) present value node prices. Given a market system oí commodity and price processes (p, q) and íor each i, a system oí present value node prices Ai = ( A~)) E A(q), we define the budget set oí the i th agent by Moreover the economic meaning oí the asymptotic condition is described by the íol-lowing remark. 
In other words, ií 7l"i E fl(S x L) then the definition oí the budget set Bi(p, q, Ai) involves both spot budget constraints and an infinity oí additional constraints which state that, at each node, the amount oí the debt contracted by consumer i should not exceed the present value oí bis íuture savings.
With such a definition oí the individual budget sets, the definition oí equilibrium is the íol1owing : Definition 8. An equilibrium with present value node prices 01 the economy f = ((Xi, ~i,wi)~I,S,R) is an element (('xi,zi,Xi)~I,(P,q)) satislying':
In the previous definition, we do not require the present value price 7l"i = (X:p(s ))8ES
to belong to.e l (S xL) though this condition is an assumption oí Remark 5. In íaet, under the additionnal assumption C5, the condition 7l"i E f l (S xL) is useless (cí. Remark 8 in Section 4).
Definition 8, adapted írom Hernandez and Santos (1991) , does not actually coincide with the definition given by Magill and Quinzii (1994) . In their definition oí the individual budget sets associated with a market system oí commodity and asset price processes (p, q), and íor each i a system oí individualized present value node prices .\i, Magill and Quinzii require írom an agent to be neither lender nor borrower at infinity. Moreover in the spirit oí the subgame perfeetion, they require this condition on every subtree oí the initial eventtree. Outside oí equilibrium, it makes sense to prevent every agent írom being borrower at infinity but not necessarily lender at infinity. In view oí this remark, we define the
alternative budget set :
This budget set is related to the previous one by the íollowing remark.
Remark 6. Bi (p,q,),i) This definition oí the budget sets leads to the corresponding concept oí equilibrium. 
Existence of equilibria with debt constraints
In this section, we prove that every asset price process that precludes arbitrage can be embedded in an equilibrium with debt constraints oí the economy E. From now and in the whole paper, an arbitrage-íree asset price process q will be assumed to be given. Proof. First let us fix a particular ), E A(q). The main steps oí our prooí are as íollows. If T denotes a time horizon, the first step is to obtain a particular general equilibrium with incomplete markets oí the T-truncated economy E(T) with the same characteristics as E, in which agents are constrained to stop trading at date T. The second step is to construct the implicit debt constraints oí this T-truncated economy. The third step consists in establishing uniíorm bounds (in T) on the parameters oí equilibria. Thus, it is possible in a íourth step to take an appropriate limit oí these parameters. The fifth step is to prove that the system oí debt constraints obtained at the limit is loose and consistent, and the final step shows that this limit is an equilibrium íor the infinite horizon econorny.
Step Even though the consumption-portfolio process of an agent be defined over the whole event-tree, a T-truncated economy is essentially a finite horizon economy with T +1 periods since the consumption-portfolio process of an agent is fueed alter date T. As it is classical, we wiIl not distinguish the finite dimensional vector pT and its natural embedding in the infinite dimensional space JR~XL defined by pT(s) =Oif s rt ST. The context will make it clear.
With a slight abuse of notation, we recall that xi(s) = wi(s) According to Florenzano and Gourdel (1994) , the finite-horizon economy &(T) has an equilibrium (xi,T,zi,T)~l,pT,q) satisfying:
(i) x1,T is optimal in the budget set Bl,T(7fT) where 7fT(s) = AspT(s).
(ii) For all i = 1, ... ,m, (xi,T,zi,T) is optimal for agent i in the budget set Bi, T(pT,q) .
With no loss of generality, we can assume that the price pT is normalized by 2:s ST A.llpT (s) 111 = 1. Note that this normalization requires an adaptation of the port-E folios that with an abuse of notation, we will still denote by zi,T. So, the claims (i) to (v) are still verified for this normalized equilibrium and we can add the additional one :
(vi) I17fTlll = 1 or equivalent1y 7fT·1 = 1 (with 1 E JRSxL defined by l(s,f) = 1).
Step 2. As Levine and Zame (1992) pointed out, in the finite horizon mode1, it is possib1e to associate with the aboye equilibrium an implicit system of debt constraints. It can be defined by where the infimum is taken among al1 (xi, zi) be10nging to Bi, T(pT, q) . The notion of implicit debt constraint means that
We emphasize that this construction cou1d have been done for any price pT, not on1y for the equilibrium price. As a consequence of the no-arbitrage condition on q, the main resu1t at this step is the fol1owing proposition to be proved in the appendix :
is (pT,q)-loose and consistent. Moreover Di,T(s) = D}(s,pT,q)
Step 3. In tilis step, we will prove that the parameters ((xi,T(s),~s('zi,T(s)), Di,T(s))~l,pT(s)) of the T-horizon equilibrium are bounded in T. • Bounds on pT(s,f). First we recal1 that pT(s,f) ~ O, hence our normalization
• Bounds on ~,(zi,T(s)). We first prove by contraposition that the first component of ~s(zi,T(s)), which is equal to q(s)· zi,T(s), is bounded. If it is not true, there exists an agent i, a node s and a subsequence denoted by T n such that Iq(s)· zi,Tn(s)l-+ +00 when T n -+ +00. From condition (iv) in the definition of equilibrium, we can deduce the existence oí an agent j such that q(s) . zi,T n (s) -+ +00 when T n -+ +00. The agent j is lender at node s. But íor T n large enough, one has pTn(s) .1 8~ (1-¡38)q(S)' zi,Tn(s) since 138 < 1.
This implies that the consumption process ('xi,T n XS\S+(8) + 1 8 + ¡38 yi ,T n XS+(8») sustained by the portíolio process (zi,T n XS\S(8) + ¡38zi,Tn XS(8») is in the budget set Bi,T n (pT n , q).
Since by Lemma 1, it is preíerred by agent j to the consumption yi,T n , this contradicts the definition oí equilibrium.
By local non-satiation, one has for each agent i, for aH nodes s, for aH (1 E s+,
r((1) . zi,T(s) = q((1) . zi,T((1) + pT((1) . (yi,T((1) -w i ((1)). Hence, írom the bounds established previously on yi,T((1), pT((1) and q((1) . zi,T((1), one deduces that r((1) . zi,T(s) is
also bounded. This proves that ~8(zi,T(s)) is bounded.
• Bounds on Di,T(s). First we recall that Di,T(s) ~ O. Let us define on S the system oí debt constraint Di,T by : T i D i,T() _7f . (W XS(8»)
~ (A tr ) -T() i() s = = -L--P (1 (1 ·W 8 8 A trES(8) A
Clearly, Di,T(s) = _pT(s) . wi(s) ií s E ST and Di,T(s) = Oií s ft STo We first prove that
Di,T is (pT,q)-loose. Consider a node s E S. If s ft ST-l, looseness oí Di,T at node s foHows írom the no-arbitrage condition. If s E ST-l, let us consider a portíolio zi(s) E IR/-such that íor aH node (1 E s+, r((1). zi(s) ~ D i ,T((1). By definition oí Di,T, one has íor all node u E s+, Atrr(u) . zi(s) ~ _7f T . (wiXS(tr»). This implies that ¿trE8+ Atrr(u)· zi(s) ~ _7f T .(¿trE8+ WiXS(tr») = -7f T .(w i XS+(8»)' Since Asatisfies conditions oí Lemma 3, one thus gets A 8 q( s)· zi( s) ~ ._7f T . (W i XS+(8»)' We recall that S( s) = S+(s) U {s} and consequently A 8 q(S).zi(s) ~ _1i T .(wiXS(8»)+A8pT(s).wi(s), Le., Di,T(s)+pT(s).wi(s)-q(s).zi(s) ~ O. Hence Di,T is (pT, q)-loose at node s.
Since Di,T is (pT, q)-loose, we can apply Propositions 2, 3 and Remark 4 to get the inequality Di,T ;::: Di,T. Moreover, it íollows írom the normalization oí 7fT that Di,T(s) ~ -M/A 8 . Hence, we deduce that íor all i, all nodes s, O~ Di,T(s);::: -M/A 8 .
Step
of bounded finitely additive set íunctions on S x L and let 11 . liba denotes the norm oí ba(S xL). For any T, the price 7fT can be viewed 'as an element oí (ba(S x L))+ such that 7fT . 1 = 117fT 11 ba = 1. Let (1( ba, '-00) denote the weak-star topology. We recall that according to Alaoglu's theorem, the unit ball oí ba is (1(ba,'-oo)-compact.
In view oí the bounds established previously, we can apply Tychonov's Theorem to get the existence oí a directed set (8,~) 
one deduces from the property (iv) of the finite horizon equilibrium that CPs(zl,T' (s)) --+ CPs(zl(s)). Note that zi,T' (s) does not necessarily converge to zi(s)
since redundant assets may exist, in particular the subnet (zi,T 9 (s)) se6 may be unbounded.
Step 5. We want to prove that for each agent i, the system of debt constraint Di is ~ (p, q)-loose and consistent . 
• Di is (p, q)-loose. Let us consider an agent i, a node s and a portfolio zi(s)
E lR J • such that r(O'). zi(s) ~ Di(O') for all O' E s+. -i . .
We want to prove that D (s) + p(s). wl(s) -q(s)· ZI(S)
:
one has Di,T' (s) + pT' (s)· wi(s) -q(s)· (zi(s) + ee(s)) :$ O. At the limit when () goes to infinity, one gets Di (s) + p(s) . wi(s) -q(s)
Di,T' (s) +pT' (S). Wi(S) -q(09)' Zi,T' (s) ~ o; { for a1l u E s+, r(u)· zi,T' (s) ~ Di,T' (u).
Note that the portfolio zi,T' (s) is defined without any reference to the portfolio zi,T' (s).
The system can be equivalently rewritten as 
Di(s) +p(09)· wi(s) -q(09)· zi(s). ~ O; { for all u E s+, r(u)· zi(s) ~ D'(u).
This completes the proof. o
Step 6. It remains to prove that (('xi,zi,Di)~l'P) is an equilibrium with debt constraints of the economy &.
It is trivial to verify that individual consumption and income transfer plans belong to the individual budget set at each node s, and that consumption plans and income transfer plans are socially feasible.
• For each i, xi E Bi(p, q, D\ Indeed, by passing to limit in the spot constraints, one has for each node s,
• We want to prove that consumption xi is optimal in Bi(p, q, Di) . To this end, the fol1owing claims will first prove that for al1 node s, p( s) > O. 
p(s)· ai(s) + q(s)i' zi(s) =5 p(s). wi(s) + res) . zi(s-) for aH s E SN;
{ r (s) . Z1 ( S-) ~ D (s) for aH s E S N + 1 • -i -i .
We recall that a consequence of the (15, q)-looseness of D is that D (s) =5 -pe s) .w l (s) for aH nodes s. This assertion together with p( s) > O and wi ( s) ~ O irnplies that p( s) . wi(s) > O and
Di(s) < O. Since G' < 1, the last rernark together with the previous systern of inequalities irnplies that
Since there is only a finite nurnber of striet inequalities, one deduces the existence of an integer T > N such that for aH T ~ T, one has
pT(s) . (G'~i(s)) + q(~)T' (azi(s)) < pT(s) . wi(s) + r(s) . (G'zi(s-)) for all s E SN, { r(s)· (G'ZI(S-)) > D' (s)
for all s E SN+l.
With no loss of generality, we rnay suppose that T > Ti. But it follows frorn the consistency of the irnplicit debt constraint Di,T that there exists sorne portfolio plan zi,T such that zi,T is equal to zero frorn date T and zi,T and G'zi coincide on SN. By construction, one has (G'aixsN,zi,T) E Bi, T(pT,q) . Since for sorne T large enough, one also has G'aixsN ~i xi,T, this contradicts the definition of the equilibriurn consurnption xi,T. 
bounded debt equilibrium and an equilibrium with an implicit borrowing limito
The proof is based on the following result to be proved in the appendix. Under Assumption C5, let us now consider a node s and an agent i. Let (x~, z~) be the consumption/portfolio plan defined by (xiXS\s+(s) + 1" +(3 xi xs+ (,,) , ZiXS\S(") +(3zi XS (s))' Since by assumption C5, x~ ~i xi, one deduces that (x~,z~) f/: Bi(p, q, D 1 ) . Since (x~,z~) obviously satisfies the debt constraint in every node and the spot constraint in every node s' =j:. s, it follows that the spot constraint in node s is not satisfied. This implies that
p(s).(x i (s)+l s )+q(s).(3zi(s) > p(s)·wi(s)+r(s).zi(s-). This inequality together with the spot constraint satisfied by (xi, zi) at node s leads to p( s) ·1" + q( s)· ((3Zi(s)) > q(s)· zi(s).
One thus gets q(s) . zi(s) < IIp(s)lh/(l -(3). Since this inequality holds for all i, and recalling that L:::l zi( s) =0, it follows that q(s) . zi( s) > -(m -1) IIp( s) 11 JI(1 -(3) for all nodes s, and all agents i. This proves that (xi, zi) E Bfx,(p, q) and ends the proof. Let us there emphasize that, as proved in Section 3, the existence oí an equilibrium with debt constraints, compatible with the given arbitrage-íree asset price process q, does not require Assumption C5. Under Assumption C5, such an equilibrium is a finitely effective and a bounded debt equilibrium. We will prove in tbis section that with the same additiona1 assumption, the same given arbitrage-íree asset price process can be embedded in an equilibrium with node prices. According to the role played by Assumption C5 in the existence oí an equilibrium with node prices (Assumption C5 was íormulated by Magill and Quinzii and is used in their existence result), the link between both approaches cannot be reduced to a simple equivalence.
Actua1ly írom (individualized) node prices, it is easy to build (individualized) debt constraints; a more precise statement will be given in Proposition 5. Under the additional assumption C5, the converse construction is only shown to be possible at an equilibrium point. Theorem 4 and 5 will make it clear. Finally, our main result, Theorem 6, is to prove that six apparently quite distinct approaches in the definition oí equilibrium give in íact under the assumptions C1 -C5 and F the same equilibrium allocations and prices.
Proposition 5. Assume that ..\i is a system of present value node prices, satisfying the conditions of Lemma 9, such that 7l'i def (..\~p (5)) sES E f. 1 
(S xL). Then there exists a (p, q)-
loose and consistent system of debt constraints ti such that Bi(p, q, ..\i) 
Proof. Let us defin~ the system oí debt constraints Di by : íor each node 5, Since 7l'i E f. 1 (S xL), and since íor every node s, ..\~ > O, Di is well defined. We first prove that Di is (p, q)-loose. Indeed let us consider a node s and a portíolio zi(s) such that for every node u E s+, r(u)· zi(s) ~ Di (u) . By definition oí Di, one has íor every node (,,») ' Since ..\i satisfies. the conditions oí Lemma 3, one thus (wixs+(,,») . We recall that S(s) = S+(s) U {s} and consequently
Hence Di is (p,q)-loose at each node s.
Let us prove that Bi (p, q, ..\i) e Bi(p, q, Di) . Indeed, let us consider (xi, zi) In B i (p, q, ..\i). It íollows írom the budget constraint in node s that ..\~ r( s) . zi(S -) ~ ..\ ~p( 5) . Let us prove that conversely Bi (p,q,D i ) e Bi(p,q,A i ) . Indeed, let us consider (xi,zi) in Bi(p,q,D i ) . Since Di is (p,q) Final1y, we can apply Proposition 2 to get the existence of a (p, q)-loose and consistent system of debt constraint iJi such that Bi(p, q, Di) = Bi (p, q, iJi) . O The previous construction can be achieved for any price system (p, q). If we apply Proposition 5 to the equilibrium prices, we obtain the fol1owing resulto ((xi,zi,>:i) This set can be equivalently rewritten as
(xi(s) -Wi(S)) + A~q(S) . Zi(S). This inequality together with the one of Remark 4 leads to
Let us consider a point xi in the intersection. First, we remark that it íollows írom the definition oí U i that xi is non-negative. Since xi E A i , there exists sorne integer . . 
Since 71'i is in .el (S xL), the right term tends to zero, when T goes to infinity. Hence one has (xi, zi) E Bi(p, q, X\ Moreover (xi, zi) is optimal in BkQ(p, q, X'). Indeed, it foHows from Remark 5 that
Recalling that xi is optimal in the largest set and that (xi, zi) E Bi(p, q, Xi), one gets the conclusion of the last assertion of Theorem 4. .el(SxL).
Proof. The proof of Theorem 5 is similar to the one of Theorem 4. Let us consider for any agent i, the two convex subsets of .eoo(S x L) defined by
Since Xl is optimal in the budget set BMQ(p, q, >. ), it follows that UI n Al = 0; moreover the assumption C4 implies that xi +1 E int(U i ). As previously, we can apply the Hahn-Banach theorem to get the existence of some non-zero element pi in (.eoo(S x L))+ = (ba(S x ~))+ such that for all (xi,yi) E A i X U i , one has pi. xi :5 pi. yi. Since xi E BkQ(p, q, 'XI) e Ai, and since by local non-satiation xi E cl(U i ), one deduces that for all (xi,yi) E A i X Ui, one has pi .x i :5 pi ·x i < pi .yi. Since pi is in ba(S x L)+, we can apply the Yosida-Hewitt theorem to get the existence of some *i E .et(S x L) such that pi and 7'I'i coincide on "finite" elements of .e00 ( S xL).
As previously, we prove that xi is optimal for agent i in the set {xi E Xi I*i·x i :5 *i .x i }.
In particular, we deduce from Assumption C4 that *i(s) > O, for every node s.
Let us now construct the node prices .xi corresponding to the present value prices *i. For any time horizon T, let us consider the set B~(p,q) defined as in the proof of Theorem 3. Since B~(p, q) is clearly a subset of Ai, it follows that *i . XiXST :5 *i . xi for all xi E B~(p, q). We have proved that the obviously consistent system of inequalities defining B~(p,q) implies that 2:"EsT *i(s) . xi(s) :5 *i . xi. As previously, there exists (( .x~,T)"EST, (1l~,T)"EST+l) E lR~T X lR¡T+l such that :
O'E,,+ and *i .xi ~ L .x~,Tp(s). wi(s).
"ES
T
Recalling that *i (s) > Ofor all s ES, we deduce from (3) that the real number .x~, T is positive and independent of T. This allow the construction of some .xi in 1R~+ satisfying *i(s) = .x~p(s) for al1 s in S; moreover using (4), one also has .x~q(s) = 2:O'E"+ .x~r(O') for all s in S. Since *i ·w i :5 *i ·x i , one deduces that Bi(p,q, .xi) e {xi E Xil*i ·x i :5 *i .w i } e {xi E Xil*i . xi :5 *i . xi}. Recal1ing that xi is optimal in the last set, it suffices to prove that (xi, zi) E Bi (p, q, .xi) to get the optimality of (xi, zi) in Bi (p, q, .xi) .
To this end, let us consider a node s and an agent í. Let (.i~, z~) be the consumptionjportfolio plan defined by (xiXS\s+ (,,) +1" +(ñiXS+(s), ZiXS\S(s) +{3zi XS (s»). Since by assumption C5, .i~ >-i xi, one deduces that (.i~, z~) fi. BkQ(p, q, 'Xi) . Since (.i~, z~) obviously satisfies the Magill-Quinzii transversality condition in every node and the spot constraint in every node s' =/:-s, it fol1ows that the spot constraint in node s is not satisfied. ((xi,zi,Di)f,;l,P,q) ~s an equilibrium with debt constraints 01 [. (ii) ((xi,zi)f,;l,P,q) is afinitely effeetive equilibrium olthe economy [. (iii) ((xi, zi) Levine and Zame (1992) ; Magill and Quinzii (1994) establish the equivalence between (iv) and (vi).
-dI! -p(s) 'Wi(S))
. Recall that the initial system of debt constraints is denoted by Di.
Let X be the set oí systems oí debt constraints defined by X = {D I Bi (p, q, D We first introduce sorne notations. We will denote by °the set [O, +oo[x [O, l] We recall that the consistency of Di at node s imp1ies the existence of sorne portfolio . .
{Di(S) + p(s), wi(s) -q(s)· zi(s)
~
and for al1 u E s+, r(u)· ZI(S) ~ D'(U).
We can now construct the portfo1io (zi(s))ses(so) by zi(s) = (3i(s)zi (s) . It follows froro the definition of (:zi(s ))ses(so) that it repays the debt d in finite time from node so.
o
